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EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE zl
1. Introduction
A recent s[udy by Alberto Alesina (1989,p.81) ranks central banks according to an index
of political independence. Alesina defines independence via objective indicators such as
the formal institutional relationship between the central bank and the government and the
existence of rules forcing the central bank to automatically accomodate fiscal policy.
In empirical research which was also published in a special issue of European Economy
(1990, pp.97-98) Alesina used these indicators to establish a measure of independence
which was then compared with the average inflation rate. By and large, the more inde-
pendent the central bank, the lower the inflation rate. For the period of the study, 1973-
1986 in Europe the Banca d'Italia was one of the least independent central banks and
West Germany's Bundesbank the most so. Inflation figures for these two countries are
presented in table 1.
Simple computations yield an average inflation-differential for the period 1983-1989 of
6,4 percentage points.
I[ is also evident from table 1. that in the 1980s a considerable part of the Italian central
government deficit was financed by monetary means. After the 'divorzio' in 1981 the
CICR 3) no longer required the Banca d'Italia to absorb all excess supplies on the
market for short-term treasury bills (Buoni Ordinarie del Tesoro and Certificati di Credito
del Tesoro (indexed)). Still in 1985 more than 22~ of the deficit was financed by
issueing assets which fall in the definition of high powered money. In July 1991 a next
step was taken on the road towards more independence. A bill was passed that makes the
president of the Banca d'Italia the sole competent authority in setting official interest
rates.4)




1 am graleful fon c~lpful comments by Matthcw Canzoneri, Theo van de Klundcrt, Rick van dcr Ploeg, Lcx
Meydam. Jacques Smulders and panicipants in a Phd-scminar at Tilburg University. Of course the usual
disclaimcr applies. Also 1 am grateful for coopera[ion by thc Ex[emal Relations and Infotmation Depariment
of De Ncderlandsche Bank, and by the Research Department of NMB Postbank. Mrs Rennie Meijer, Miss
Jolanda Bakhuis and Mrs Maqa Speekenbrink lyped the manuscrip[. George Alogoskoufis' visit at Cen[ER for
Economic Research (October 1990) inspired me to write the paper. It is writ[en in lhe framework of the NWO
rescarch project "Rules versus discretion in the conduet of short-term macrocconomic stabili~a[ion policies
undcr unccrtainty" (450-226017). Financial xuppon from NWO is gralcfully acknowlcdgcd.
Thc CICR (Cumitnlo Intcrminislcrialc Ixr il Crcdilu c il Rislwnnio) chairul ny thc 'rrwsury - is thc ulmosl
authurity un munctary Iwilicy anJ sct.r dircctivcs fur thc Banca d'IWlia. For an intcresting discuxsion nbuul lhc
'divuaiu' ~cc Tabcllini ( 1988).
Howcvcr in [hc last tcn ycars - in criscs of confidcncc - Banca d'halia conductui scvcral inlcrvcntions on
behalf of the public. This practice gavc rise to the following pun in thc Bonner Biirscn-Zeilung of July 30: "
(..) Vor zehn Jahren sci auf die Ehe zwisehen Zentralbank und Schatramt nicht die Schcidung, sondem ein
Konkubinat ge(olgt."Page 2 INTRODUCTION
Monetary Union (EMU) in the bugetary field binding rules are required that would
exclude access to direct central bank credit and other forms of monetary financing (Delors
Report 1989, p. 24).
Table 1: Italian budeet deficits and monetarv accomodation 51
Year é3 '84 '85 é6 é7 é8 '89
Budget deficit
central government
(96 GDP) 10,7 11,5 12,5 11,4 11,7 11,6 II,O
Public debt
(96 GDP) 66,7 70,9 78,4 83,2 87,7 91,8 92.y
Financing by
monetary means
(96 deficiq 5,1 10,5 22,4 10,0 8,1 2,1 - t.C
Inflation 14,6 10,8 9,2 5,9 4,7 5,0 c,,ti
P.M. German inllation 3,3 2,4 2? - 0,2 0,~ 1,3 ~,8
Moreover in November 1990 the Draft Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank was presented to the ECOFIN-Council in Madrid.
Article 7 concerns independence and reads:
"In exercising the powers and performing the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaty
and this Statute, neither the ECB nor a national central bank nor any member of their decision-
making bodies may seek or take any ínstructions from Community Institutions, governments or
Member States or any other body. The Community and each member State undertake to respect
this principle and not seek to influence the ECB, the national central banks and the members of
their decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks."6)
Therefore the transition from the EMS to European Monetary Union will increase central
bank independence and - if Alesina is right - lower European inflation rates.
In an interesting paper G. Alogoskoufis (1990) investigates the relation between the
dynamics of inflation and monetary regimes. He demonstrates that fixed exchange-rate
systems like the international gold standard and the Bretton-Woods gold dollar standard
appear to be associated with negligible persistence of inflation, while regimes of managed
exchange rates are associated with very high inflation persistence. He uses an overlapping
wage contracts model to propose that the higher inflation persistence is the result of the
higher monetary and exchange rate accomodation of price changes in flexible exchange
rate regimes.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relation between European inflation dynamics
51 Source: Eij(fmger and Gerards (1991), p. 76, pp. 129 - 136.
61 See Committee of Governors (1991), p. 3.INTRODUCTION Page 3
and the transition from the EMS regime towards monetary union. This transition will
decrease the scope for accomodating (discretionary) monetary policy and therefore
influence European inflation persistence.
On the basis of a New-Classieal two-country real exchange rate overshooting model with
fixed exchange rates and overlapping wage contracts ~ we show that an increase in the
fraction of the European govemment budget deficit that is financed by selling monetary
assets to the ESCB results in an increase in the degree of persistence of European inflati-
on.
The plan of this paper ls as follows. In section 2 the model will be presented. In section 3
[he analysis is simplified by defining averages and differences. The steady state is solved
in section 4. In section 5 the solution to the dynamic adjustment is presented. Monetary
and fiscal policy are made endogenous by the introduction of rules in section 6, also with
the monetary rule an index of central bank independence is introduced. Finally the main
theoretical result of the paper is obtained in section 7, whilst a summary and questions for
further research are to be found in section 8.
2. The Model
The EMU consists of two countries -say Germany and Italy- that are of similar size and
structure.
In presenting the model we focus on the equations of Germany; the Italian variables are
denoted by an asterisk. The variables i and r are ratios expressed as arithmetic differences
from their steady state values, all other variables are logarithmic deviations from steady
state values. Exogenous variables are barred.
(1.1) Y-W1(P-w)fYn




(1.3) Y- g- al (i - Et Pcttl f pc) t a2 y` -~ a3 q-~ u
0 G a2 c 1 a1 1 0 a3 ~ 0
(1.4) pe - p f~t q 'h c~, c 1
(1.5) m- p - bl y - b2 i f v bl 1 0, b2 ~ 0
(1.6) i-i'
(1.7) q - (P~ f e - p)
~? In the 'cconomics of EMU' literature overlapping contracts models are widely uscd. See for instance A.
Hallct and D. Vines (1991) and M. Lossani and P. Tirclli (1991).Page 4 THE MODEL
(1.8) ~ m-t- (1-~j (m` f e) - m~ g)
Where
. E is the expectations operator
. F is the forward shift (lead) operator
. L is the backwazd shift (lag) operator
~ endogenous variables include
y (aggregate supplyldemand)
i (the nominal interest rate),
p (the producers' price),
Pe (the CPI),
q (the real exchange rate),
m (the nominal money supply),
w (the nominal wage)
. The shock terms are u and v, each of which is white noise:
ut - N (O,a~2)
vt - N (O,a~z)
As regards equation (1.2) we assume that the European economies aze chazacterized by
staggered wage contracts (Taylor 1979, 1980).
Following Alogoskoufis (1990) we use the Calvo (1983) variant of the Taylor model,
according to which each contract has a fixed probality 1- 6 of being re-opened in each
period. Thus, e is the proportion of wage contracts that aze not renewed in any particular
period, and is a measure of the degree of nominal wage and price sluggishness.
As contract wages reflect expected inflation, after substituting (1.2) in (1.1.) one obtains
the expectations augmented Phillips curve. Of course yn denotes the natural level of
xt Thc casc of German hcgcmony in the EMS would of course be an interesting altcrnative spxification. In that
case wc have (1.8 b) m- m. See Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989).AVERAGES AND DIFFERENCES Page 5
output, and wt describes production technology9).
It should be noted however that the supply side of the model differs in major respects
from that of Alogoskoufis. The latter paper features monopolistic competition, with prices
a mark-up over unit labour costs. In the labour market nominal wages also reflect
expected unemployment. Therefore the supply side of the Alogoskoufis model can be
labelled 'Neo-Keynesian'.
Instead we assume perfect competition, market clearing and no effect of expected
unemployment on nominal wages. If B~ 0 in the short run the model has Keynesian
features and policy invariance (Sargent and Wallace (1975)) dces not hold. However due
to real wage rigidity in the long run (see section 4) money is neutral and the model has
Classical features. Therefore following Meydam (1991 p. 41) our supply side is of the
'New-Classical Synthesis' type.
Aggregate demand depends upon the real exchange rate, the real interest rate, foreign
output, a fiscal shock g and a stochastic IS-shock u.
Equa[ion (1.4) describes [he home consumer price index (CPI). We assume ~~'h, so
residents in both countries have a preference for their own good.
Demand for real balances is a function of income, the nominal interest rate and a
stochastic LM-shock v.
Perfect capital mobility (no capital controls), perfect asset substitutability, and irrevocably
fixed exchange rates ensure that European nominal interest rates are equalized. The Board
of Central Bank Governors (BCBG) of the ESCB sets the European money supply (ma).
lo) Thc paramctcr ~ represents the German share in the initial European money supply.
Use of interest rates rather than the money stock corresponds to actual practice. However,
because we want to avoid the "indeterminacy of the price level" critique (Sargent and
Wallace (1975), we choose an easy way out."'
The equations for the foreign country (Italy) are symmetric to the equations (1.1) -(1.5).
Therefore the model consists of 13 independent equations.
3. Averages and Differences
The analysis can be simplified (Aoki (1981)) by defining the averages and differences for
any variable x, say,
xa - ll2 (x -~ x')
xd - (x - x~)
yi In the rcmainder of this paper following Alcsina and Grilli (1991) we normalize y~ and y~' at uro. In lhe
rasc of a hncar homogcnous CES pruduction func[ion y-~ I t(1 - a)k, ~t would hc givcn by
~~ - ~l( I - a).
'~~ We (ollow Alberto Giovannini's (1990) blueprint for the ESCB's agencies.
"1 Of coursc an alternative would be to spc~cify an interest rate rule aimed at kecping the price Icvel at a certain
targct.Page 6 AVERAGES AND DIFFERENCES
The model can [hen be re-written in terms of the following decoupled system
European averages
(3.1) ya - wl (Pa - wd)
(3.2) wa - (i-B)
Et 1 Pa
(1-BF)
(3.3) (1 -a~ya - ga f LLa - at la ~ al Et ~Patf 1
(3.4) ma - pa - bi ya - b2 ia f va
(3.5) ia - i
(3.6) ma - ma
Equations (3.1) -(3.6) describe the aggregate European economy. Note that in the
absence of nominal rigidities (6 - 0) aggregate sypply (3.1) is described by a standard
Lucas-surprise function according to which deviations from the natural rate (which was
normalized a[ zero) depend upon unanticipa[ed inflation. To see this we take a closer look
at equation (3.2). Setting B- 0 yields
(3.2') wa - Et-t Pa
Substitution of (3.2') in (3.1) yields:
(3.1') Ya - W~ (pa - Et-1 Pa)
which is a standard Lucas-surprise function. The Board of Central Bank Governors
(BCBG) of the ESCB sets the European money supply, so ma is exogenous.
National differences
(3.7) yd - W 1 (pd - wd)
(3.8) wa - (1-9)
~-i P~d
(1-BF)
(3.9) (1 f a~ yd - gd f 2a3 q f ud - a~ id t a~ Et a,d ~
(3.10) md - p`~ - b~ yd - b2 idf vdSTEADYSTATE
(3.11) id - 0
(3.12) Pod - (1 - 2k) Pd
(3.13) pd - - q
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Equations (3.7) -(3.13) describe the differences in the two economies. Differences in
fiscal stance (equation (3.8)) are exogenous. Because the intra-European nominal
exchange rate is irrevocably fixed money stock differentials are endogenous.
For notational convenience in the remainder of the paper we quit 'barring' exogenous
variables.
4. Steady State
Since the analysis is based on ratíonal expectations, the dynamics is determined in part by
the steady state. It is therefore convenient to begin with a characterization of this
equilibrium. Denoting the steady state by overbars, it is attained when
~ F P~~t~l - E~ P~~t~l - P~~(`) ~z~
Thus the equilibrium in the goods and money markets of the two economies is
(4.1) Y - ~t (P - w)
(4.2) w - p~
(4.3) y- g - al i f aZ y` -~ a3 q-F u
(4.4) Pc - P f ~ q
(4.5)m-p - bi y-b,i f v
(4.6)
(4.7) q - - pd
The equations for Italy are symmetric to equations (4.1) -(4.5). Note that according to
equation (4.2) in the long run real wage rigidity (RWR) holds; in the long run money
wages are fully indexed to the CPL The solutions to these equations are
(4.13)Y--F~Wtq
(4.14)Y` -N~wtq
12~ An al[crnative condition is Fi F pis,d -~~a,d -~.,aPage 8 STEADYSTATE
4.15 - -1 -d } ~d ( ) 9- 2(t t a,,) 1~~~ t 2a3
(g )
(4.16) i - 1 (ga } ua)
á~
(4.17) P- a2 (gd i- ua) f 1 (gd -~ ua) - va f ma
a~ 4(1 t a2)'~,w~ t 4a3
(4.18) p~` - b2 (ga f Ua) - 1 (gd f Ud) - va t ma
a~ 4(1 t cL,)lu.i~ t 4a3
(4.19) Pc - OZ (ga f ua) ~- (1 - 2~t)
(gd -~ Ud) - Va f ma
ai 4(1 t a2)~cm~ t 4a3
(4.20) Pcx - a2 (ga f ua) -
4 1 f(1 - aiF`)t 4a (gd
f Ua) - Va f ma
i ( az)~ t 3
(4.21)m- (1 t2~~ib~)
(gafud)f'fzvafma
4(1 taa)~ua, t aa3
(4.22) m` - (1 } 2~`W~b') (gd ~- ua) - 'fz va f ma
4(1 t a.,)~mi t 4a3
Note that given exogenous averages and differences (xd, xa) home and foreign exogenous
variables follow from
x - xaf'~zxd
x~` - x' - 'h xd
Assuming no random shocks (va - vd - ua - 0) from (4.16) it is seen that, in the long
run, an increase in government expenditure at home or abroad will raise the steady state
nominal~real interest rate equally. From (4.15) it is seen that an increase in domestic
government expenditure (gd ~ 0) will raise the relative price of domestic goods (pa), thus
lowering the real exchange rate q.
The home real appreciation lowers the consumers' wage (4.2) below the producers' wage
thereby boosting home output (4.13) and lowering foreign output (4.14).SOLUTIONS TO DYNAMICS Page 9
Thus a fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-nei n g bour policy.
Because of the real appreciation a home fiscal expansion moves the home current account
into deficit. Since all fiscal expansions are bond financed"~ the home capital account is
moved towards surplus.
In general the net outcome depends on the values of bt, aZ, b2, a3, v,t, ~c and the interest
sensitivity of international capital movements (X).
Formally a home fiscal expansion will generate a balance of payments surplus if
X ~ bZ(a3 } 2~~~~)
1 t 2~.mlb~
Thus, a surplus is more likely the greater is the interest sensitivity of international capital
movements (X) and the income sensitivity of the demand for money (b~), and the smaller
is the marginal propensity to import (a2), the interest sensitivity of the demand for money
(b2) and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (a3).
Since we assumed perfect capital mobility (X -~ ~) to be the typical case the capital
account effect will dominate.
Therefore a home fiscal expansion will trigger (net) capital flows from the foreign
country to the home country thereby increasing the home nominal money stock (4.21) and
decreasing the foreign nominal money stock. Due to RWR an inerease in the European
money supply (md) will lead to equiproportionate increases in home and foreign wages
and prices (p, p~`, p~, p~', w, w') and has no real effects.
5. Solutions to Dynamics
The solution to the dynamic adjustment of the economy is obtained in two parts, first for
the differences then for the averages. These solutions can then be transformed to the
original variables
National Differences
The differential demand curve can be obtained by substitution of (3.12) and (3.13) in
(3.9) (see section 3)
2a u 1 2 d 1 d t ud t 3 ~( - ~ (s.l) y - (1 ~
~,)~ ) (l t ~) 9 (1 t ~)
"[ OQtf 1
The division of Europan demand between German (y) and Italian (y~`) goods depends
positively on the differential fiscal stance and the real exchange rate.
~s~ Monetary accommudation (monctiralion) of dclicits is introduccd in sulion 6.
14~ See appendix A.Page 10 SOLUTIONS TO DYNAMICS
The only ambigious sign in (5.1) is sign
al(1 - 21~,)
(1 t ~)





Therefore an expected real appreciation shifts European demand towards Italian goods.
The differential surprise supply function can be abtained by substituting nominal wage
differentials (3.8) in the differential supply curve (3.7)
(5.2) yd - ~t (1 - U - B)(1 - 2p) E ) Pd (1 - BF) ` I
Equating (5.1) and (5.2) (market-clearing) yields the following dynamic equation for the
European inflation differential 15'
(5.3)
~~I(1 t a2) t 2a3 (1 - B)(1 - 2~)E al(F - 1)(1 - 2~) ~ d
~I(1 } ~) (I - BF) ` - I - ~I(1 ~ a2) E P -
1 d d (8 tu)
Note that if F.~.t - F.~ - F- 1 this equation reduces to the steady state solution for the
real exchange rate; i.e. equation (4.15).
Using the fact that F en L operate on time subscripts of variables (not on the time at
which the expectation of that variable is held) and that F,~ p~d - pld, on multiplying both
sides of (5.3) with L(1-BF) we end up with the following second order expectational
difference equa[ion for European inflation differentials




'S~ Md using 9 - 'Pd.SOLUTIONS TO DYNAMICS
Q- wl(1 } th)[1 -(I - B)(1 - 2u)1 t 2a3 t al(1 - 21~)
A
x d- (b - L)
(8d t ud)
~ A
A- B[~I t(I t~) f 2a3 t al(1 - 21~)1 t al(1 - 2t~)
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This equation is solved in Appendix B using factorization. For the moment we focus on
the expected inflation differential conditional on information at t-1 that is
(B10) (F - ~ta)(F - )`zd)L E [Pca ~ t - 1] - (-1) E [xta ~ t - 1]
a
where (F -)`la)(F -)`Za) is the factored polynomial in the forward-shift operator, and ~ta,
)`2a are the two roots of difference equation (B9) and are given by
~ta' ~Za - 2a } ~~ I 1' 4a a`
and the subscript "d" denotes the differences model.
If ~)`la ~ c 1 and ~)`zd ~~ 1 the differences model will be saddlepoint-stable1ó~.
Multiplying both sides of (B10) with F and some rearrangement yields
(s.s) E ~pca I t-t] -
Since
a{(F -~iJ)(F -~~)}
E[xd I ~ t-l~
(3.12) P~a - (1-2~) pa
(5.6) E [pd ~ t-1] - -(1 - 2~) E[x~1 ~ t-1)
a{(F - ~Id)(F - )`~)}
Substitution of (5.6) in the equation for nominal wage differentials
(3.8) wa - (1 - B) E d
(1 - BF) ~-I P~
16~ See Begg (1982), p 42.Page 12
yields
SOLUTIONS TO DYNAMICS
(5 7) ~,a - ( 1 - B) -(1 - 21t) E (xdi ~ t-1]
1 - BF) ~ a{(F - ~~Q)(F - ~)}
since - ' ~ ~ ~~
(1 - 9Fj ;so
(5.7) can be rewritten as
5.8 wa - (9 - 1)(t - 2~) ~ [ a; I 1 ( ) ~ 9`F; E x t-1
a{(F - ~Id)(F - ~zd)} ;so
or
(5.9) wa - (8 - 1)(1 - 2~.)
~ B`E [x;;.l ~ t-11
a{(F - ~~d)(F - ~.zd)} ;-o
In order to solve for the division of European output (ya) we need the solution for the
European inflation differential.
This solution is given'~ by
(5.10) pa - 1
(1 - ~~dZ.)(1 - a~ld) ~ ~E[x~;~11
Substitution of (5.9) and (5.10) in
(3-7) Ya - w) (Pa - wa)
Gives
'~ It is obtaincd by using the lag operator in (B13).SOLUTIONS TO DYNAMICS
m
d w~ ~ i
(5.11) y -




w~(9 - 1)(1 - 2~) " d
~ ~E fx,.i.i I r-~f
a{(F - ~id)(F - ~~d)} ,eo
Finally endogenous money stock differentials are simply
(3.10) md - pd f b ~ y`~ ~- v~
Substitution of (5.10) and (5.11) in (3.10) gives
(5.12) md - (1 } w~b~) m -` ~ ~`2d
(1 - ~~dL.)(l - a~ld) i-0
d
fx~,i I tl
- w~b~(B - 1)(1 - 2~) ~ B' E
lXdi.t ~ t-1] t vd
a{(F - ~1d)(F - ~~)} iL~o.
European AveraQes
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The demand curve for European goods can be obtained by combination of IS curve (3.3)
with LM curve (3.4)




((1 - a.,)b~ t a~b~)
b.,
((1 - a,)bz t a~b~)
a~b~
a3 - ((1 - a,,)b~ t a~bi)
Therefore the demand for European goods depends positively on real money balances, the
fiscal stance and expected inflation. Of course ot~a2 measures the relative efficacy of
monetary versus fiscal policy.
The aggregate surprise supply function is obtained by substitution of the wage equation
(3.2) in the supply curve (3.1):Page 14 SOLUTIONS TO DYNAMICS
(s.14) ya - wt (1- (1 - 9) EJ - 1) P" (1 - eF~
Equilibrium in the goods market is attained when (s.l) -(s.2)
Thus
(s.ls) wt (1 -(1 - 6) E~-1) Pa - ot(ma - pa - va) f a2(ga f ua) -~ Q3 Et ~a 1 (1 - e~
On multiplying both sides of (s.ls) with L(1 - BF) and using the definitions of lag-and
forward-shift operators we end up with the following second order expectational differen-
ce c;yua[ion for thc I~uropean pricc Icvcl:
(s.16) Pc - ti E ~Pr.l ~ t] t S Pa1 t xt
where ~y - Q39
r
S- al t a3 t wIB
r
xca - (e j, L) (~1(ma - va) f QZ(gd i- ua))
r- e(w, f~, ~Q3) ~- Q3
Transforming Differences Results to Averages Results
Note that the dynamic structure of (s.16) is exactly like the one prevailing in the
differences model, i.e. equation (s.4).
Therefore we can transform the results for the differences model to the averages model by
setting a- y, S- S, ~- 0 and "d" -"a"
The averages analogon of (s.s) then becomes
(s.17) E[p~a ~ t-1] - -1 E[~.1 I t-1]
ti{(F - ~la)(F - ~,)}
where ~ta, ~~, are the two roots of the averages analogon of (B9) and are given by
1 } ,~ I 1 4S
~la, ~2a - J ~ --
2y y- ySOLUTIONS TO DYNAMICS
If ~~ta ~ C 1 and ~~Za ~ 1 1 the averages model will be saddlepoint-stable.
Substitution of (5.17) in





(5.18) wa - (8 - 1) ~ B'E lxa;i~ ~ t-1]
y{(F - ~~a)(F - ~..a)} ;~o
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In order to solve for aggregate European output (yd) we need the solution for the
aggregate price level.
This solution is given by the averages analogon of (5.10)
~
(5.19) p`` -
(1 - )`~aL)(1 - y~~Q) ~ ~2a ` E ~x~; ~ t]
Substitution of (5.18) and (5.19) in
(3.1) ya - mt (p`~ - wd)
gives
m
(5.20) ya - w~ ~~~ E[Xt„ I t1
(1 - J~~~)(1 - Y~ia) ;-o
-wi(9 - 1) m
y{(F -~ia)(F -~,.~,)} ó B` E lx~.;,i ~ t-1]
Finally the average nominal interest rate (ia - i- i`) follows from
(3.4) mó - pA - b~ yó - b2 ia ~- vó
Thus
(5.21) i~ - 1(Pa -~ v~ - ma f b~ ya)
b~
Substitution of (5.19) and (5.20) in (5.21) givesPage 16 POLICY RULES
(5.22) ia -
( I t wlb~) ~ ; a
62(i -~i~)(1 - y~~Q) ~ M.~ E[x~.; I rl
w~b~(B - 1) "
- b2ry{(F - ~~Q)(F - ~)} ~ ~ E lxr~;.i ~ t-1] t ~z (va-ma)
The solutions for averages and differences can be transformed to the original variables.
Given averages and differences for any variable x, say, home and foreign variables follow
from
X - Xa f ~h Xd
x~` - Xa - ~~z Xd
For example the solution for German output is simply a linear combination of equations
(5.20) and (5.11); i.e.
y - (5.20) ~- lh ~` (5.11).
6. Policy Rules and Central Bank Independence
In this section we focus on the averages model. Monetary and fiscal policy are made
endogenous by the introduction of rules. Also with the monetary rule an index of central
bank independence is introduced.
Monetary Policy
The standard expression for monetary accommodation of government budget deficits in a
simple IS-LM model (Turnovsky 1977, p 71) is
(6.1) O1VI -,Go (G - tÍ') 0 5 tGo 5 1
Equation (6.1) says that a fraction l~o of the (nominal) budget deficit is financed by bonds
sold to the ESCB ("printing money"), the remaining (1 -~o) is financed by net private
bond sales.
Of course t is the average tax rate and "hats" denote absolute values.
Abstracting from taxes (t-0), (6.1) can be rewritten in terms of logarithmic deviations
from initial steady state values. Simple transformations lead to:
(6.2) Om - ~G (gfP)lsi
Equation (6.2) can be rewritten as
iH~ For a dcrivalion of lhis formula sce Appendix C.POLICY RULES
(6.3) m - ~ (gtP)
(1-L)
Next we replace equation
(1.8) ~ f(1 - ~(m~` t ga - m"
by
.}




Therefore instead of being completely exogenous the European System of Central Banks
now partly accommodates (monetizes) European government deficits.
Thus ~ is a parametrization of monetary accommodation and an index of central bank
independence.
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy in the EMU stabilizes European GDP around its natural rate (y~a) level
according to proportional policy rule (Phillips 1957)
(6.5) gd - -ct (Ya ' Ynd)
and ct is an index of countercyclical fiscal flexibility.
Substitution of monetary and fiscal rules in the expectational difference equation for the
European price level, i.e. equation
(5.16) Pta - 1' E lpai ~ t~ f g pa i f xa
where xu - (B-L) (v~(md - Va) f a2(g~ ~- ua))
r
and abstracting from issues concerning [he relative efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy
(Q~ - QZ - a) yields
(6.6) Ptá - II(t } rp) t v{c,w,(2 t t~(2 - 6)) -~l} na
t II(1 . e) t Ba(ciwi(1 . t~) - tG)
(IIrp t actw~(2 - B)) a
n(1 t e) t Ba(c~w~(t t t~) -~,) pr-2Page 18 POLICY RULES
} II(1 t E) t Ba(clwl(1 t IG) -~,) E ~r.l ~ t]
~ (1 - L) o









zca - (B ~ L) (o(ua - va) - y~ )
and yn is normalized at zero;
The dynamic structure of this equation is quite similar to that of (5.4) and (5.16) except
for the presence of the two period lagged price level pa 2 . This result emerges because
in this paper monetary accommodation is parametrized by means of rule (6.2). That is,
money r E owth (~m), rather than the level of the money stock is linked to the price level.
In the Alogoskoufis paper the parametrization of reserve-and exchange rate regimes is
entirely in levels19~ thereby avoiding higher (than second) order equations.
As said because of rule (6.2) we end up with a third order expectational difference
equation in the European price level.
However, the presence of p~ 2 in (6.6) presents no particular problem20~.
Define
(6.7) n! ~ pa I
'~ See Alogoskoufis (t990), p 10.
Z~ For insànce see Blanchard and Kahn (1980), p 1306.INFLATION PERSISTENCE
where "n" denotes the new average variable.
Then expectational dynamics is governed by the system
(6.7) Ra a
r ~ Pr-1




n(1 t E) t 9v(~IWI(1 t~G) -~G)
II(1 t rG) t O{C~WI(2 t 1~(Z - 6)) - iGf
n(1 t E) t BU(CIW1(1 t~) -~)
- (IIto t OCIWI(2 - B)) a-
II(1 t E) t Ba(clWl(1 f,G) - tG)
Q -
1
n(1 t E) t Ba(clWl(1 t~) - 1~)
Zta - (B - L) (~(ua ~ va) - yna)
II
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In the next section we will solve (6.8) and examine the sensitivity of the solution with
respect to monetary accommodation.
That is, we will examine the relation between central bank independence and inflation
persistence.
7. Central Bank Independence and Inflation Persistence
The main theoretical result of Alogoskoufis (1990) is that increases in the degree of
monetary accommodation will result in an increase in the degree of persistence of
inflation. This result is obtained in the following way. First a closed form solution for
expected inflation is derived.
Next one takes the first derivative of the smaller (stable) root with respect to the degree
of monetary accommodation.
If the sign of this derivative is (unambigiously) positive we get the (unconditional)
persistence result. In this section we will establish our main theoretical result - greater




6.8 Q ( ) Pt - n E~Pr ~ ~ f I t u pa ~ t t ii nr ~ t ~(1-L) zr
using factorization.
Next we will take the first derivative of the stable root with respect to the index of central
bank independence.
Equation (6.8) can be rewritten as
(7.1) Pta -~1 E(Pr.l ~ ~l t~ Pa 1 t xr
where
xt~ -~ na i t ~(1 - L) zQ
Note that the dynamic structure of (7.1) - the European price level under 'rules' - is
exac[ly like
(5.16) Pta - ti E lP(tl ~ i~ t S pa
1} xa
That is, the European price level under 'discretion'.
Therefore we can transform the results obtained under discretion to those under rules by
setting
y-r1,S-~randxta-xtr
The solution to (5.16) is
(5.19') Pta -~la Pa 1 t( 1 )~ ~..a E ~xtti ~ t) 1 -ryÀla i-0
Multiplying both sides with (1 - L) yields
~
(5.19") ~pta - ~la 0 ~7t 1 t( 1 )~ Á,,~ E ~0 xai ~ t~
1 -y~la i-0
Now we transform (5.19") to the solution for European inflation under the prevailing
monetary and fiscal rules. The result isINFLATION PERSISTENCE
(Í.2) l, p~a - Álar ~ p~1 t ( 1 )~ ~..nr E ~0 xtii ~ r]
~ -~~lar i-0
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where ~tar, ~~ - 1 } ,~ 1 4~r
20 ,t' n
and the subscript "ar" denotes the averages model under rules.
If the two roots lie on either side of unity the difference equation for expected European
inflation under rules is saddlepoint stable.
From (7.2) one can see that the persistence of European inflation conditional on informa-
tion at the end of period t- 1, is equal to ),tar.
Now we show how ~tar depends on the degree of central bank independence ~.
First we express the characteristic equation (associated with the polynomial in the forward
shift operator) as
(7.3) pZ f bp f c
where b --(~Iar f),~) and c-~tar~2dr
The smaller root ~tar ~s given by,
(7.4) ~lar - - ~~zb - 'IZ[b2 - 4c]~h
Taking the first derivative of ~tdr with respect to the degree of central bank independence
tG we find that it is given by,
a~lar a~lar aÓ a~lar aC
- - t a,G ab ~ a,~ ac ~ á,~
or
a~lar - (b~ - 4C)-~h 9b uBb vB (7.5) a~ - E {clwlo ~ 2 t(2 - 9)] -(2 ~ 1)} } 2e
(clwl - 1)
If cI - a- wl - 1 this expression reduces to
(7.6) a~1ar - (b~ - 4C)-~~ , (1 - B) ~ 0 a,G E
From (7.6) it can be seen that an increase in the degree of European central bank
independence - i.e. a decrease in ,~ - reduces inflation persistence.
A maximum increase in persistence is obtained in the absence of nominal regidities (9 -
0), whilst more monetary accomodation has no effect on the degree of persistence in thePage 22 SUMMARY
limit case of a zero re-opening probability.
The intuition behind (7.6) can be explained as follows.
As long as there is some fiscal flexibility (cl ~ 0), active stabilization policy is conduc-
ted.
Lower monetary accommodation of the resulting deficits lowers inflationary expectations.
Since expected inflation falls, (new) reopened contracts will reflect these expectations,
and the path of contract wages will be set lower than otherwise. These lower wages are
reflected through the whole path of príces, with the net result being lower inflation
persistence.
8. Summary and Questions for Further Research
Within the context of a two-country model with rational expectations, overlapping wage
contracts and fixed exchange rates, it is shown that greater European central bank
independence reduces both inflation and inflation persistence.
The first conclusion can be viewed as a'rational expectations underpinning' of empirical
research by Alesina (1989). The second concerns the relation between central bank
independence and inflation dynamics and can therefore be viewed as a dynamic extension
of the Alesina relation.
So far we studied monetary policy independent from tiscal policy. That is, in the model
changes in fiscal flexibility were conducted irrespective of monetary accommodation.
However a key implication of the theory of financial restrictions is that monetary and
fiscal policies must be coordinated (Sargent and Wallace (1984), Miller (1983), Buiter
(1990)).
Therefore ignoring taxes and interest payments on government bonds first the govern-
ment's flow budget constraint must be satisfied. That is the primary deficit must be
financed either by printing more money or by issuing more bonds. In addition to the flow
constraint we have to impose the terminal or transversality condition that the present
discounted value of all future seigniorage revenues equals the present discounted value of
all future primary deficits. This rules out everlasting 'Ponzi games': the government
cannot forever increase its expenditures simply by increasing its seigniorage revenues.
If we exclude continuing wealth transfers from the private sector, more central bank
independence today means less seigniorage revenues today and consequently less
government spending (fiscal flexibility) tomorrow. Therefore an irr.portant item on our
research agenda is to incorporate the flow- and transversality constraints in the model.
We expect that the inclusion of these constraints will reinforce our main theoretical result.
For more central bank independence today will require less spending tomorrow. Since
government expenditures have both real and nominal effects inflationary expectations
today will fall thereby further lowering contract wages and inflation persistence.
Also important is the observation that I did not study a lot of issues that are central to the
'economics of EMU' literature. For instance no attention was paid to important institu-
tional problems with regard to the management of a monetary union in Europe. A very
fine essay concerning the latter is Giovannini (1990).
Also I sidestepped issues concerning the optimal size of the public sector and the optimal
revenue mix for treasuries and central banks. This is discussed in Van der Plceg (1990)
and (1991). The conclusion of the latter paper is that in order to asses the case for an
independent ESCB one should trade-off the welfare gains associated with enhancedIMPERFECT CAPITAL MOBILITY Page 23
monetary discipline and lower inflation against the welfare losses associated with a sub-
optimal government revenue mix.
Appendix A. Imperfect Capital Mobility
In this appendix we focus on the more general case of imperfect capital mobility.
Equation (1.6) in section 1 is a special case of the BP curve
(A1)aZ(Y-Yy)-a39-X(i-i`) -0
Where [a2 (y - y`) - a3 q] is the current account deficit whilst X(i - i~) aze capital
inflows.
If X~ oo (perfect capital mobility) this equation reduces to
(1.6) i - i~`
We will now solve the steady state two-country model wi[h (1.6) replaced by (A1).
Subtraction of (4.3) from (4.10) (see section 4) yields
(A2) (1-t-a~) Yd -(gd f ud) f 2a3 q- at id
where the steady state is denoted by overbars.
In the steady state (A1) is simply
(A1')a2(Y-Y~)-a39-X(i-i`) -0
Thus
(Á1,~) ~d - ~~3 q ~ ~2 id
X X
Substitution of (A 1') in (A2) gives
(A3) X(1 t~)tUlQ2 yd -(éd -F Ud) f a1~3 t 2a3X q
X X
From section 4 we know [hat
(4.13) Y - -KW t q
and
(4.14) Y~ - u~t q
Thus (4.13) -I- (4.14)Page 24 IMPERFECT CAPITAL MOBILrTY
(A4) yd - -2wwt q
Combining (A4) with (A3) and re-arranging terms gives the solution to the steady state
real exchange rate (c~ under imperfect capital mobility
(AS) q - -1 (gd f ud)
(2~1(1 t a2) t 2a3) t al(2~~laz } as)x-1
Equation (3.10) (see section 3) in steady state is simply
(A6) md - pd f bt yd - b2 id f vd
where
(3.13) pd - - q
Thus
(A6') md -- qd f bt yd - bZ id f vd
Substitution of (A4) in (A1") gives
(A7) ld -
-(a3 t 2ftWla2) q
X
Substitution of (A7), (AS) and (A4) in (A6') in yields
(A8) md - x(1 t 2p,co161) - b2(a3 t 2Nwla2) (gd f Ud) f Vd
(2N,~vi(1 t p2) t 2a3)X t al(2N~1a2 } a3)
Of course
(A9) m - md f '~z md
Suppose the Board of Central Bank Governors of the ESCB keeps the European money
supply at its initial steady state value (md - 0) then the German money stock can only be
affected by capital flows ('Iz m`~)
A home (German) fiscal expansion will trigger net-capital flows from the foreign
country - i.e. increase the German money stock - if md 1 0.
From equation (A8) it can be seen that this will be the typical case if
(A9) X(1 ~- 2~.wtb1) - bz(a3 t 2~.~1a2 ~ 0
or equivalently ifTHE REAL EXCHANGE RATE Page 25
(A10) X ~ b,(a3 t zWwia2)
(1 t 2F~~tbt)
[n the spe;cific case of per(ect capital mobility this condition will always be fulfilled.
Appendix B. The Solution to the Expectational Difference Equation for the Real
Exchange Rate
This appendix follows Blanchard and Fischer (1989) p.p. 261 - 65.
We will solve equation
(5.4) Pcd -~ E lP~ i ~ tl t~ P~~ t xa
where xid - 6-L (gd } ua)
Á
We will use the method of factorization which was introduced to economics by Sargent
(1979).
First in (5.4) we take expectations based on information at time t-1.
This implies
(B1") E[Pid ~ t-1] - a E (pd i ~ t-1] t~ pd~ t E[xd ~ t-1]
Next we factor equation (B1") to express E[p~d ~ t-1] as a lagged function of itself and
of expectations of current and future values of xd, E[xd; ~ t-1] , i? 0.
To do so we use the lag operator, L, which operates on the time subscript of a variable
(not on the time at which the expectation of that variable is held)
L E ]p;~ ~ r-1] - E[p~~-~ I r-1]
so that in particular,
L E (pdi ~ t1 - E ~pd ~ t] - p~
For convenience, we also introduce the forward operator, F- L-~.Page 26
Thus
FE [pd~ ~ t-1] - E(P.;.1 ~ t]
THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
This last step is an application of the law of iterative expectations21~.
Since in case of rational expectations individuals avoid systematic prediction errors,
expectations are based on the most recent information set i.e. fl~.
Using the definitions of F and L, we can write (B1") as
(B8) [-aF -f- 1-~L] E[pd ~ t-1] - E[xd ~ t-1]
The next step is to factor the polynomial in parentheses. To do so, we rewrite (B8) as
(B9) [ Fz -~ F f (~) ] LE [pcd ~ t-1] - (-1) E [x~d ~ [-1]
a a a
We can factor the polynomial
{F2 - [lla]F f (Qla)} as (F - ~ld)~(F - ~`Zd), where ~ld } ~2d - ~ and ~ld~2d
a
a
If one of the roots is smaller than one in absolute value and the o[her larger than one in
abolute value (S.4) will be saddlepoint-stable i.e. the differcnces model will have the
saddlepoint property.









where (see section 5)




a- ",(t t~)[t -(~ - e)(1 - zlr)l t za, t a,(t - zl~)
n
We can rewrite (B9) as
(B10) (F-~la) ~` (F-~2d) LE [Pcd I t-1] - (-t) E [xid ~ t-1]
a
or
(B11) (1-~tdL) E[Pcd ~ t-1]
-(a~,
)(1-~ F)-i E[xd ~ t-1]
..d
Since ~~Zd-~ ~ c 1, we can expand (l-~Zd-~F)-~ as
~ )`2d'' F` to get
i~o
~
i d (B12) E[P~d I t-1] - ~id P~i t(-)~ ~zd E [xr.i ~ r-l]
aM„d i~o
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Equation (B12) gives the expectation of p,d as of t-1. The last step is to derive the
solution for ptd. To do so, we use (B12) to get an expression for E[pdi ~ ~~ and replace
E V,~ i ~!~ in (5.4).
This gives
~
Ptd - a~ld Ptd }(~)~~.,d E[x~i.l ~ ~l }~ pr i} x~
M.d i~0
Reorganizing, and using the fact that, from the definition of ~ld, (~i)I(1-a~ld) -)`ld~
givesPage 28 THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
~




-pid - ~td (P~ i) - (1-a)` ) ~ ~`zd E[X~; ~ tl
id ;-o
Note that according to equation (3.13) -p`~ - q. Thus
~
(B14) q~ - ~1d q t-l - ( 1 ) ~ ~d E [x~i ~ [l
1 -~~Id i-0
m
Since ~ ~ - ~~ i-o (Á~~-1)
(B 14) can be rewritten as
(B15) qt - ~la qt-] - ~~ E lXd i I tl
(~ - l)(1 - a~~d)
where
xd - F'xd - F'(6-L) (gd f ud)
!ai A
ThUs
x;i - Á{e( g;i f ud; )-( gdi-~ f u~i-~ )}
So
E ~x~i ~ t~ -
EL Á `B( gii } uii)-( g~i ~ } uii ~ )} I t~THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
d - 1 d } J d d t7
SO E[x(aj I t~ - Á E~e( é~tii ut~i) -~t~i-1 t utti-1) I 1
Since by definition E[ud; ~ tJ - E[ud;-t ~ t] - ~
(B16) E [xd; ~ t1 - ~ (6 Sd~ - Bd;.t )
Substitution of (B16) in (B15) yields
~~
(B17) 9c - ~`ta qt-t - (~,,~ - 1)(1 - a~~d)A
)( Bgd; - g;;-t )
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Suppose that at time t- 0 the European economy is in steady state with qQ - 0 and that
at time t- 1 the home government is believed to engage in a permanent 1~o real deficit
increase.
V i, 1 ~ i 5~ E[8~, ~ tl - 1
From (B17) it can be seen that in order to clear the European money market, the real
exchange rate has to jump to a value
qo -
-J~.,~(B - 1)
A(~ -1)(1 - a~td)
whilst the steady state effect is obtained by setting q~ - q~-t which yields
A(~.1~ - 1)(t - a~td)(1 - ~td)
Thus
90 - - 1 - ~td
4~Page 30 MONETARY ACCOMMODATION
Since in genera122~ ~~ld ~~ 1, 9 o is greater or smaller than 1, so our two-country
4~
model features real exchange rate under~over shooting (Dornbusch 1976).
Appendilc C. The Linearized Money Supply Rule.
We start with the standard expression for monetary accommodation of government budget
deficits
(6.1) DIvf -~o(G - tY) 0 5,~0 5 1
where
IvI - nominal money stock
G - nominal government expenditure
t - average tax rate
,Go - fraction of the budget deficit financed by printing money and 'hats' denote absolute
values.
Abstracting from taxes we get
(C1) AM - t[io g P
where g is real expenditure and p is the price level.
Note that simple rearrangement of (C1) yields the concept of monetarv seigniorag-e
(Sm - ~IVIIp), which is widely used in empirical researchz3~.
(C~) Sm - ~o g
Of course (C2) measures the actual wealth transfer which the private sector has to make
in onder to receive base money in the amount lN from the central bank.
((' 1) can bc rc-writtcn as
(C3) M- LM f,~~ g p
zzi
)`td - 1 if B- 0 (no nominal rigidities) and p -'á (real interes[ parity).
231 For an interesting exposition about di(fercnt conccpts of seigniorage sec Klcin and Neumann (1990).REFERENCES
where L is the backward shift operator.
Taking total differentials of (C3) yields
(C4) dlVi - L dM f t~io g dp -f tlio p dg
Remember [hat in the model
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m- denM -dIv1~M, where Iv1 is the initial steady state value of the nominal money
stock,
Therefore
(C5) dIv1IM - L dIV1lIvI f(tlio g dp)IM f(~lia p dg)I1VI
or:
(C6) dlvilM - L dIv1IM f(,Gapg)~M ~` dp~p f(,~ogp)I1v1 ~` dglg
where dp113 - p, dg~g - g thus
(C7) m - Lm f ((~oPg)M-t)P ~ ((~oPg)M-t)g
Note that (gp)~M is the initial nominal government deficit in terms of the intial (nominal)
money stock. Using ~I„ as an abbreviation for M~(gp) we end up with
(C8) Om - ~o~lGm(P f g)
Using ,~ as shorthand for ,~o~tGm we get
(6.2) Om - ~G (g } P)
note that if ,Gm - 1, ~ - ~o
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